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I
ESTABLISHED POWER AND PoVaT REoFM

In 1967, three years after the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act, the
White House began to have second thoughts about its original emphasis on community action and maximum feasible participation as a method for ending poverty.
While the planners of the Act might have supposed originally that organized pressure by the poor could be accommodated by the system-as the system had accommodated so many interest groups-and conversely, that the organized poor would
for this purpose abide by the rules of the game, the reality from the point of view
of community organization was quite different. Community action based upon
maximum participation was more than a tactical concept. It was the release of a
potentially great force, namely, territorially organized citizen power. No other
interest group has that "sovereign" base. Thus, organizations based on this principle were quite extraordinary compared to the normal varieties of interest groups
which pressure the government. It soon appeared to the government not that
the poor would willfully break the rules of pressure politics, but that the government
had endorsed a principle of organization that itself transcended the character of
interest group politics.
Mayors began to complain that the newly organized and funded neighborhood
organizations were threatening the power of city government, and they sought to
terminate these organizations and their funding, either directly from Washington
or through the independent community action agencies. As a result of the complaint,
Congress passed the Green Amendment,1 permitting mayors to get control of their
cities' anti-poverty programs.
The new arrangement enabled the government to withdraw funding from
neighborhood organizations which confronted city power and to begin to fund antipoverty programs within a pro-city framework. This rearrangement, in the sensitive
world of politics, required a "felicitous" adaptation of the theory of poverty to
which the political intention of placing OEO powers in the hands of the city management would conform. The new theory was local economic enterprise, referred
to as "community economic development."
But the capture of political control over OEO did not solve the mayors' poverty
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problems. The cities were still disproportionately populated by poor people, and their
rate of increase in coming years would, by all projections, be very high. One
political view was that there would have to be some absorption of members of the
lower class into the established order to decrease the number of poor and to create
a group from this membership which would control those who remained. Given
this understanding, it seemed most feasible to shift the funds of the OEO program
from those who had formerly organized the poor to confront city government to
those among the poor who had the greatest ambition to enter the system. Since
being in the system of our society means making money, the new patronage
would go to those in the poor community who wanted to make money, rather than
to those who wanted to organize the poor politically.
This signaled an important shift. While job training and manpower programs
were part of the first community action programs, this training had emphasized job
placement in factories and other business establishments of the city. Now the idea
was to encourage the enterprising people in the communities, and assist them to
establish small businesses and little industries which could employ the poor people.
And it was to be this group of people-those ambitious for gain-on whom established power would place the task of cooling off the cities. They thought this would
demonstrate the mobility of the system and, at the same time, suppress the political
movement of the underclass.
Since late 1968, and until the present, OEO funding money has gone to economic
development projects. The community organizations which started earlier under
the community action program had to reorient their grant proposals in the direction
of economic development in order to remain funded. A variety of approaches was
taken to accomplish this shift: assistance to small business in the poor community,
small industrial development in the poor neighborhood, cooperative arrangements
with big corporations, community ownership schemes for merchandising and home
purchasing.
This is the present state of the government's and-poverty program, but it is
already on the way out. The new program of family assistance represents the next
step in the government's political program for the poor. Family assistance, which
is likely to spell the demise of OEO as a program agency, returns to an old welfare
notion-to wit, financial assistance on the basis of low-wage labor. The appearance
of this development upon the scene raises the question of how much energy the
professional should now invest in a conception of community economic development
based on federal assistance. In short, while the idea of community economic development is still promoted by the government,' the cycle of anti-poverty initiatives is
turning back to a government commitment to individual labor welfare rather than
community economic development.
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Family assistance is only part of the present administration's program for dealing
with the political problem of the urban poor. The regional movement for metropolitan government, also part of the establishment's agenda, is hailed as the best
way to cure the political ills of the city. This movement calls for the expansion of

urban government on the basis of multi-county consolidation. The origins of city
expansion are quite old, dating back to the first colossal enlargement of Philadelphia
from an area of x-'/ square miles in 1854 to its absorption of the entire county of
Philadelphia in that same year. The reasons for the annexations and consolidation
in the nineteenth century were varied, but by the second decade of this century, a
resistance to annexation had slowed the pace of municipal growth. Following World
War II, there was a spate of annexations, particularly in the South and West, and
more recently the expansion drive has reappeared in the guise of regionalization and
metropolitan government. The general arguments which are advanced for this
movement are based on its potential for increasing tax resources, tax equalization,
and operational efficiency. But it is the political intention of this movement which
must be considered as its most significant aspect.
Since the i95o's, the cities have been losing their middle-class and wealthy
residents at a fast rate to the surrounding suburbs. While this phenomenon has
been decried from the point of view of a loss in tax base, it has also disturbed
the old pattern of public services and welfare distribution which ensured the
political control of downtown power. The administrative practice of giving better
services to the middle-class population cannot today produce the former political
results because of the decreasing population of that class in the city. In addition,
the cost of applying the former service standards of the middle-classes to the poor,
combined with an increase in welfare spending, is prohibitive. Aside from the
cost, there is the further problem that long-established habits of public service work
against any attempt to increase the services and welfare directed to the poor. Both
the political structure and the administration of the city are being eroded because
of the government's failure to adjust to the new class composition of the cities.
There are only two possibilities which will allow the cities to continue as viable
propositions in the face of this population change. Either the city government must
change its political constitution to adapt to its new class compositon or the cities
must absorb the entire middle-class population that has fled to the suburbs.
Apparently, the politicians have chosen the latter course, opting for a program
of regionalization which preserves downtown as the political and commercial center
of the metropolitan area, neglects the slum city (which is fast coming to mean the
entire present city limits), regains the familiar suburban middle-class as the social
base for a new constituency, and proceeds with traditional patterns of public service
administration.
The consequence of this movement toward metropolitan government is clear; it
means the displacement of public services from within the city limits to the suburbs,
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and the establishment of some police arrangement to control the immensely expanded
slum of the present city. The economic prescription of the metropolitan strategy
would nullify any necessity for community economic development in the old city
neighborhoods, for the government of downtown power can find its economic
foundation in the suburbs.
II

THE

PoLITIcs OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

Turning to the question of community economic development in the neighbor-

hood organization, we see a much different line of development of the issue. There
was nothing particularly complex about the original theory of community action
and its strategy of maximum feasible participation. It was thought that the best
route toward eliminating poverty was to organize the poor politically in the cities or
rural areas, so that they could pressure government for a greater share of public
resources for services and welfare. It appeared to be an intelligent idea in three
respects. First, it recognized the conventional view that to get fairer laws, better
public services, and more money from the public treasury, you have to organize
and put pressure upon government. The political scientists had been saying this
for years, in innumerable books on pressure politics and interest groups. Thus,
poverty was, like any other special interest, subject to the application of this maxim

of politics.
The second element of the organization-action approach was that the neighborhood was the best base for organizing the poor. This is obvious enough because the
poor, unlike doctors and lawyers, are associated in territories. The third element
favoring this approach was the maximum participation stipulation. The greatest
power the poor have, after all, is their numbers and their collective intention and
action.
As a matter of fact the community action method, in all its simplicity, was quite
ingenious and produced results in organization and pressure. It gave a political
structure back to neighborhoods which had lost their political identity because annexation and municipal reforms had destroyed the power of the neighborhoods at both
the municipal and ward levels.
It was obvious to community leadership, however, that when independent, federally funded organizations based upon maximum participation began to appear,
the government would withdraw support. But it was also apparent that only these
principles of participation and organization could produce the political results
desperately needed by the poor.
Thus, from the inception of the Community Action Program and the first funding of independent neighborhood organizations, it was clear that the crucial questions concerned the amount of funding available to those who would organize the
neighborhoods as a unit of power and whether that funding could be retained in
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subsequent years. If the basis of anti-pov&ty theory were community pressure, then
funding would be a problem of supporting a mix of political organization and
political education as well as enough programs of direct social benefit to tie residents
into the neighborhood organization.
As for the matter of getting re-funded the next year, that problem was met in
terms of political strategy. It was resolved by a delicate combination of efforts at
building community political power and at the same time boxing the government into
a re-funding commitment. On this basis, some organizations were able to blend into
the re-funding process, moving two steps forward and one step backward. Other
organizations failed to take a step backwards; their militancy was too exposed,
and they lost their funding.
From the outset it was apparent that eventually, tactical error, or a major change
in government policy or law, would remove most organizations from the funding
train, and that another source of funding-an independent source-had to be found.
This problem is elaborated to draw out the reality of the economics of community
organization and to show the error of the conventional notion that the economics
of the anti-poverty program meant lifting individuals out of poverty-pulling people
above the poverty line. It was true that many people were lifted above this line, but
this was largely because of staff jobs in neighborhood organizations geared to
providing either political education or the social benefits necessary to tie people
to political organization.
When the federal policy changed in 1968, and favor shifted from community
action based upon maximum feasible participation to community economic enterprise, it seemed to contain a possible temporary solution to the problem of funding
the neighborhood political organization. The government wanted enterprise rather
than political action in the neighborhood; it would move the people out of the
meeting hall and put them behind cash registers. The community organization
could not expect continued federal funding and hence, its survival depended upon
generating enterprises whose profits could pay for the organization and its political
program. An array of ventures and offers of assistance appeared, including federal
grants and loans for capitalization, and training assistance from large corporations.
Also, the government uncharacteristically acquiesced to such notions as community
ownership. Anything, even socialism, was preferable to continued funding for
neighborhood political organization.
The new line was received in the community with mixed feelings. On the one
hand, political organization could not be abandoned. On the other, community
ownership and enterprise assistance was also important. An infusion of wealth into
the communities was consistent with the long-range need of a base of local wealth
to support political organizations. And, of course, new wealth would promote the
long-range objective of community prosperity. In short, at this period, it was clear that
the only means to neighborhood improvement was through the establishment of

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

independent community organizations, and it was also clear that the community

had to have an internal economy capable of supporting itself.
Faced with the new economic policy of OEO, the community organizers agreed
to write grant proposals promoting entrepreneurial development based on private

enterprise or community ownership. But they also understood that tactically as much
money as possible under these economic programs would be applied to the political
objective of organization; that is, they would continue political organizing in a com
munity development framework. The result would be that the political organization
could continue while attention was paid to developing a local economy. Further,
the priority of economic enterprise would accord with the requirements of advancing
political organization. Housing projects and supermarkets were high on the economic
development list, although in a number of cases workshop production of goods was
undertaken.
This is the state of things in poor communities at the present time. Many
organizations have ceased to exist because they failed to make the economic shift, and
a more radical politics have taken over in those neighborhoods. What the government failed to appreciate was that under the community action program they were
indeed paying for political education and political action in the neighborhoods, but
for a kind that had peaceful possibilities, albeit under a political rearrangement
of the municipal constitution. By withdrawing funds, the government antagonized
the communities and made their situation more desperate.
The present represents a new stage in the area of community development.
Community action organizations that lost funding had to find new sources of
support. Those continuing political work with funds received under the rubric of
community economic development must discover a way to free themselves from
dependence on government money if they hope to achieve their political aims.
Regionalization challenges the community organization in the ghetto to strive for
independent political control in their own neighborhoods rather than endure the
police control which would prevail under a metropolitan plan. The prospect of
regional government alters the economic question as well. Since regionalization
suggests a new unity between the government downtown and the middle class in
the suburbs, the likelihood of a viable, independent economy in the neighborhood
further diminishes. And to relate the political and economic questions, it appears
that the politically organized neighborhood is obliged to be the principal developer
of its own economy.
III
NEIGHBORHOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY

The conclusion to be reached, then, is that community development efforts cannot
rely on outside sources to improve the economy of the neighborhoods. External
funding will end with the advent of the government's regionalization program.
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Under this condition, there is no future for the government assistance to small
enterprise in the neighborhoods, or even for employment training for the poor,
since the function of regionalization will be to dissociate the present cities from the
economy of production in the suburbs. The problem of community economic
development is rather the capacity of the neighborhood organizations to build a
self-sufficient economy, first to support its own local political control and, second,
to support the prosperity of its inhabitants through a local basis for internal and
external trade. It is a harsh conclusion to place such great responsibility on the
neighborhood organization, but this is the desperate necessity which the political
maneuvers of the government have imposed upon the poorer neighborhoods. There
is, however, a way by which the poor neighborhood can confront the problem
of economic development and independence.
The important features of a poor neighborhood are, first, the discrepancy between
the aggregate expendable income of the neighborhood and the paltry level of its
commerce and, second, the discrepancy between the considerable tax revenue the
neighborhood generates and the low level of benefits it receives in public services
and welfare. In both cases, the neighborhood exports its income. Hence, the income
and tax revenue of the neighborhood is of no service to its economic and political development. Its present internal commerce is dependent, as is its level of public services,
on commerce and personnel outside the neighborhood.
With regard to expendable income, the familiar picture of the poor neighborhood
is that its residents spend the largest part of their income outside their territory and
another part in commerical places and for rents inside the territory to corporations or
individuals who reside outside the neighborhood. In all, a very small portion of
the income remains within the neighborhood. Thus there is a steady and unrelenting
dependence characterized by a dollar drain which the residents replenish through
outside employment.
Over the last decade, the proportion of external to internal expenditure for
consumer goods has increased. There is a variety of reasons for this, including
changes in residential patterns, downtown marketing, and transportation. Within
the neighborhood there is, correspondingly, a sharp contraction of marketing and
commerce. Small store after small store is dosing up. Food marketing is confined
to chain stores in a pattern which also applies to furniture and clothes.
Smaller and older shops find themselves unable to cope with either the political
conditions of the neighborhood or the competition from chain stores. The business
these stores might have counted on is absorbed by the stores which can offer low
prices by buying in quanity and expanding to meet the needs of new shoppers.
This trend has sharply reduced the commercial energy of the neighborhoods and it
is likely that soon the only trade left within the poor neighborhoods will be for
food and rents. Furniture, appliance, and drug stores as well as many other kinds of
trading establishments are leaving poor neighborhoods. As for rents, landlords in
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many areas are simply abandoning their property because of the difficulty of collecting
rent and the expense of repairing old buildings. As the trend develops, the proportion of income expended within the neighborhood for commodities will decrease
and a greater share will go downtown.
So the picture of the neighborhood economy is one of increasing barrenness. The
destruction wrought by riots in the past decade, combined with the failure of store
owners to rebuild and of the city to assist commercial redevelopment, contributes
to the trend. Because commercial decline is consistent with the metropolitan
strategy, there is no lending and capitalization for new ventures in poor black
neighborhoods. Commercial initiatives in the poor neighborhoods are viewed as
adventures, not as commercial undertakings.
A similar pattern of net outflow is revealed upon comparison of the value of
public services received in exchange for neighborhood tax expenditures. In his study
of the Shaw-Cardozo neighborhood of Washington, D.C. Earl Mellor reveals a
tax payment of $44 million from a population of 87,000. This amount comes out of
an aggregate personal income of $i44 million for the area. Mellor calculates that
the dollar value of visible public services and welfare received is below $34 million by
the most likely measure of the distribution of public services in a city, namely wealth.
Therefore, there is a net outflow of $io million from the neighborhood tax payment.
Furthermore, taxes paid out go largely to public employees such as policemen
and teachers who live outside the neighborhood but who come into it to perform
their services, and partly to welfare recipients in the neighborhood itself. This is
analogous to the expenditure of the greater proportion of income for commodities
and rent in commercial establishments outside the neighborhood (or inside establishments which are externally owned). This disproportion is even more dramatic
because, as Mellor suggests, out of a calculated minimum benefit of 334 million
for Shaw-Cardozo, welfare payments, social security, and unemployment compensation amount to $xo.9 million, or 23 per cent of the payment. Thus, of the
$44.6 million paid in taxes by the neighborhood, only about $1o.9 million of that
is received back in cash. Hence, Cardozo exports about $33.9 million a year to pay
for services, just as it exports the greatest portion of its expendable income outside
for shelter and commodities. If the trends in taxation continue and if the government achieves its announced intention of reducing the welfare load, the disproportion of tax revenues for public services will also increase.
The bulk of tax revenue pays for personnel who live outside the neighorhood.
And, despite recent rhetoric concerning decentralization of public services and
welfare administration in the city, we find that residents of the neighborhood must
increasingly go outside the neighborhood for the services their taxes support. The
variety of public service activity originating in, or with offices located in the neighborhood, is steadily reduced and concentrated. As an example, while the neighborhood
'E. Mellor, Public Goods and Services: Costs and Benefits (mimeo., Institute for Policy Studies, x969).
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pays taxes for education, the latest tendency is for its school children to be bused
out of the neighborhood to schools in the far reaches of the city. Health care facilities
are increasingly centralized, or locally unavailable. The same is true for fire prevention, welfare administration, police, and vocational rehabilitation. As with the
trend in commodities, the trend in public services marks a decline in neighborhood

location.
In view of these conditions, it can be said that the principal characteristic of the
poor neighborhood is not its poverty but the diminution of its commerce and public
administration. Its residents earn a considerable expendable income, in the aggregate, and pay considerable taxes. This payment must, however, be understood as
support to the economies of neighborhoods outside the poor neighborhood. With
the advent of metropolitan government, the slum city will continue to earn income,
but its expenditure for commodities will constitute a primary support for a commercially-renewed downtown and its tax payments for services will be a primary

support to the suburbs whose middle class population will increasingly be involved
in public employment.
The result of this tendency will be stagnation and decay for the neighborhoods
of the present city. They will have few commercial or public service activities of
their own. They will be locked into a dependent relationship with the suburbs
and downtown which will foster further erosion. If one accepts the statement of
Rousseau that "it is impossible to make any man a slave unless he first be reduced
to a situation in which he cannot do without the help of others," he must conclude
that the poor neighborhood has become economically enslaved, not because of an
absence of income, but because of its dependence upon outside economies for commodities and public services.
The primary economic problem of the neighborhoods today is not to increase
the aggregate income, for no matter how that income increases, its flight-in pay-

ment for commodities and public services-will also speed up. The net effect will
be to strengthen a downtown economy and suburban bureaucracy. This result
can be prevented only if the neighborhood can create an internal economy and
political control to attract and keep its expendable income for commodities and public
services. The internal expenditure for these two necessities is related, in that tax
payments to neighborhood employees for services performed can contribute to
commercial activity in the neighborhoods. Thus, the resulting commercial prosperity
can become a stronger base for neighborhood taxation.
The conventional conception of community economic development in the poor
neighborhoods has been the direct organization and establishment of indigenous
enterprise, whether owned privately or by some community organization. The two
major difficulties with this approach have been capitalization and marketing management. If businesses were successful in original capitalization, they often collapse

LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

because of marketing difficulties, whether through disorganization or because they
could not meet the competition.
The problem of capitalization cannot be met simply through privately-owned
lending institutions because such banks cannot survive the trial and error of commercial development that aims to achieve a marketing and management organization suitable to the environment of poor neighborhoods. Nor can a capitalization
program be based on the unreliable expedient of federal programs which may put
$ioo million in black banks one year and nothing in them the next. In short, the
ingredients for a successful capitalization program must include substantial funding, regularly available investments, and independence from profit-making. In
short, capitalization for neighborhood economic development must be conceived of
as a public service and based upon an internal tax.
On the basis of the figures denoting outflow of taxes from the Cardozo neighborhood, it is apparent that funds for neighborhood capitalization programs must come
from the $44. 6 million paid by that area in federal and city taxes. Since Mellor's
study demonstrates that there is a net outflow of tax revenue, any neighborhood which
could retain this excess would have an annual capital fund of $Io million for
economic development, without affecting the present level of public services and
welfare. With capitalization of an internal economy as a priority, its capitalization
fund might be even greater as would be the quality and efficacy of its services and
welfare programs.
The question of a suitable form of neighborhood commercial organization cannot be taken up without answering first the question of whether effective commercial organization can precede political organization. If the only feasible strategy
for neighborhood capitalization is neighborhood taxation, then the retention of
neighborhood tax revenues and administrative control of their expenditure will of
necessity be the organizational context of, and the precedent for, the appropriate
organization of commercial development.
In summary, it is the thesis of this article that reliable community economic
development can only evolve out of the existing fiscal resources of the neighborhood, and that such resources exist in neighborhood tax expenditures. This application is consistent with the aims of community action which, although originally
seeking to pressure city government for fair distribution of services and welfare,
must take its course from the rebuff of government with its insistence on regionalization, and move toward self-control through neighborhood government.

